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ABSTRACT
In this article, I look at Muhammad Iqbal’s legal vision for an Islamic
Republic. By focusing on the 1930s, the last decade of his life, I piece
together how Iqbal’s constitutionalism was hospitable to legal trans-
formation up until sovereign power conflicted with the principles of
tauhid (unity of God) and the somewhat obscure concept khatm-
e-nabuwwat (finality of prophethood). In mapping the conceptual
tension of Iqbal’s thought in relation to the individual, the commu-
nity and politics in late colonial India, this article speaks directly to
debates on Islamic constitutionalism, conceptual counter-
geographies of international law and the intellectual history of
Pakistan and India’s Constitutions.
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On 14 December 1948, in Karachi, with ample ceremonial pomp, members of the
Constituent Assembly mourned Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s sudden death. In their eulogies,
the delegates reminisced over Jinnah’s startling life, his unrelenting commitment to shield
India’s Muslims from the All India National Congress and his political foresight to establish
institutions that could spur his democratic dream for Pakistan. They also generously seasoned
their speeches with verses fromMuhammad Iqbal (d. 1938), a Cambridge-educated barrister
with a knack for writing poetry.1 It was Iqbal’s patriotic hymn tarana-e-hind (India’s
anthem), full-threadedly chanted by a huge Hindu-Muslim crowd on the eve of indepen-
dence in 1947, that reassured Gandhi in his belief that “Hindus and Muslims would never
resort to the sword for the solution of their difficulties”.2 Gandhi’s words fell on deaf ears in
the thick of an on-going civil war that amplified Pakistan and India’s birth pangs.3 Nazir
CONTACT Adeel Hussain hussain@mpil.de Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International
Law, Heidelberg, Germany
1For biographical details see Annemarie Schimmel, Gabriel’s Wing: A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muhammad
Iqbal (Brill 1963).
2The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi: Volume Eighty-Nine (Publications Division Government of India 1983) 264.
Gandhi was not naive. Recent scholarship has unravelled the richness of Gandhi as a political thinker. More refreshing
accounts have also challenged the standard view that Gandhi was simply a non-violent universalist: see Faisal Devji,
The Impossible India: Gandhi and the Temptation of Violence (Harvard University Press 2012); Dieter Conrad, Gandhi
und der Begriff Des Politischen (Wilhelm Fink Verlag 2006); Karuna Mantena, ‘On Gandhi’s Critique of the State:
Sources, Contexts, Conjunctures’ (2012) 9 Modern Intellectual History 535; Ajay Skaria, ‘Gandhi’s Politics: Liberalism
and the Question of the Ashram’ (2002) 101 South Atlantic Quarterly 955.
3Historiography on South Asia has been reluctant to embrace the term civil war to frame the explosion of violence in
the wake of India’s rushed decolonization in 1947, though most people who lived through this calamity regarded it as
such. For a highly illuminating longue durée account on the conceptual flip-flopping the term civil war lived through:
see David Armitage, Civil Wars: A History in Ideas (Yale University Press 2017).
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Ahmad Khan of the Muslim League’s conservative wing and a big landowner from West
Punjab, sorrowed Jinnah’s death by ascribing borderline mythical qualities to him: “A field
marshal amongst privates”, Jinnah was for Khan, “the hero of Carlyle, the super-man of
Nietzsche”, and to top it all off Iqbal’s “Marde Momin” (man of faith).4 Jinnah’s astonishing
life had established, Nazir Khan reasoned, that there wasmerit in Iqbal’s great man reading of
history: the “effort of a single man of faith” could indeed “change the course of destiny”.5
Iqbal’s auspicious foretelling of the messianic “coming of a man of the type of our great
Quaid-i-Azam [exalted leader (Jinnah)]”, Nazir Khan concluded, had surely catapulted Iqbal
from a reluctant politician into the lofty spheres of a “philosopher-poet” and a “seer”.6
Muhammad Iqbal had been called a philosopher-poet before. While reviewing an early
translation of Iqbal’sAsrar-i-Khudi (Secrets of the Self), a lengthy poem packed with a list of
ingredients to bake a “new man” deftly spiced with individuality, the British humanist EM
Forster mused in the 1920 issue of the literary magazine Athenaeum, whether Iqbal—the
“poet-philosopher of the East”—had not simply recycled conventional European ideas.
Iqbal’s khudi (self, individuality)7 reminded Forster of Nietzsche’s Übermensch
(superman).8 And therefore, in Forster’s reading, khudi ought to be interpreted as
a profoundly modernist undertaking; one that emptied out the historical baggage perpe-
tuating Muslim backwardness, which is to say, the trials and tribulations Muslims faced in
battling the alienating forces modernity ushered in from at least the nineteenth century.
Stepping back and looking at Iqbal’s thought from a global perspective confirms CA
Bayly’s suspicion that constitutional liberalism as it emerged in India orbited around
“spiritualized, radical and nationalist” doctrines.9 In so doing, it took more inspiration
from the thoroughbred “liberalism of France, Spain and or Italy” than from the cold
utilitarianism and rationalism of the Anglo variety, which so readily lent itself for colonial
domination.10 In contrast to British parliamentary Whiggism, as Bayly persuasively shows in
Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire, Indian liberals from
the 1840s onwards appropriated, transformed, and fed back to the West a strong version of
constitutional liberalism that sought to curb the despotism of the Company and later the Raj.
Iqbal’s worries were different. A member of India’s minority Muslim community, he
feared what may happen in a democratic India, once the British had left. Iqbal was suspicious
4The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Deb 14 December 1948, vol IV <http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/
1434537775_658.pdf> accessed 22 October 2018.
5ibid.
6ibid.
7Khudi can be understood as acquiring religiously tainted agency or selfhood within the paradigm of colonial
modernity. It was principally directed as a critique against the mystical Sufi notion of fanaa (annihilation of the
self). Fanaa had overwhelmingly negative connotations for Iqbal, who regarded it as an expression of resignation,
political decline, and altogether obscure Eastern otherworldliness. The act of departing from the Sufi tradition and
promoting khudi as a counter concept to embrace modernity could easily be read as a result of the split mentality
that has infected colonized thinkers. This psychological pattern received plenty of theorization in postcolonial
literature: from Frantz Fanon’s double-consciousness to Bhabha’s hybridity. See, Frantz Fanon, Peau noire, masques
blancs (Éditions du Seuil 1967); Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (Routledge 1994).
8In his review of Iqbal’s poem Asrar-i-Khudi, EM Forster is the first to have made this connection: “Like other of his
contemporaries he [Iqbal] has been influenced by Nietzsche; he tries to find, in that rather shaky ideal of the
Superman, a guide through the intricacy of conduct. His couplets urge us to be hard and live dangerously; tigers, not
sheep; we are to beware of those sheep who, fearing our claws, come forward with the doctrine of vegetarianism…
The significance of Iqbal is not that he holds [Nietzsche’s doctrine], but that he manages to connect it to the Quran.”:
EM Forster, ‘Review: Sheikh Muhammad Iqbal, The Secrets of the Self (Asrar-i-Khudi), Translated by Nicholson’ (1920)
29 The Athenaeum 803.
9CA Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire (Cambridge University Press 2012) 4.
10ibid.
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of liberal democracy’s promise that the rational individual required to constitute the popular
sovereign, could transcend and erase the particularities of politics. For Iqbal, such claim to
universality clashed with the lived reality of Indian society, divided as it was along ethnic and
cultural markers. Hindus, who would effortlessly make up the majority in an independent
India, could easily use their numerical strength to permanently boot out minorities from any
meaningful representation in parliament, while hiding their majoritarianism under the
veneer of parliamentary democracy.
After repeated demands for stronger constitutional safeguards to protect the rights of
minorities, Iqbal eventually opted for a separate Islamic Republic instead. As opposed to
putting the free and rational individual at the centre of his democratic theory, Iqbal’s republic
primarily required Muslims endowed with a specific character and smelted together by
a peculiar vision of individuality. Like a number of his contemporaries, Iqbal warmed up
to the two nation-theory. Unlike the mainstream view, however, which read an eternal
struggle of Hindus and Muslims back into Indian history, Iqbal’s concept of the Muslim
nation was something to be striven towards, not something to be replanted from the past.
Iqbal believed that the best way to actualize this national sentiment in the present, was
through individual political action.
The 1930s for India, as for most parts of the world, was a decade packed with political
upheaval. The constitutional corset that the British government had stitched for India,
diligently woven from European cloth and embroidered with generous executive powers,
was beginning to suffocate. Gandhi and Nehru, the two towering figures of the Congress
Party, openly critiqued colonial rule. Gandhi rung in the decade with a demand for Purna
Swaraj (complete self-rule) through a “truth force” Hindu nationalism; Nehru selectively
piggybacked on this concept by cocktailing swaraj with strands of Indian communism. Iqbal
followed these debates closely and eventually started thinking about a constitutional frame-
work that could be accountable to a higher law. For Iqbal, this was ideally done in a Muslim
India. Here, the limitations imposed on the exercise of sovereign power ought to be drawn
from Islamic theology. But Iqbal was not cheering for the revival of aMuslim golden age long
left behind in the dunes of Medina. He knew that in different times societies were confronted
with different challenges. A close reading of ancient texts was not enough to confront the
problems of the day. As opposed to digging out and hermeneutically polishing an old sharia
law, then, Muslim societies needed to come to terms with modernity untied from such
ancient constraints. This move was hardly unusual. In the beginning of the twentieth century,
especially after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Muslim thinkers around the world
pushed to transform and modernize their societies and their systems of governance.
In The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, a collection of six lectures
delivered in Hyderabad, Aligarh, and Bombay in 1929, Iqbal comes closest to
a systematic analysis of his legal vision for Indian Muslims.11 Most scholarly recon-
structions have rightly taken these lectures as their main subject of analysis.12 But Iqbal
was not an armchair philosopher caged in an ivory tower who occasionally descended
from his carefree metaphysical heights to speak to the common folks. He was, above all,
a politician and a poet who laboured hard to bring his political vision into reality.
11Mohammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Oxford University Press 1934).
12Notable exceptions are: Iqbal Singh Sevea, The Political Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal: Islam and Nationalism in Late
Colonial India (Cambridge University Press 2012); Javed Majeed, Muhammad Iqbal: Islam, Aesthetics and
Postcolonialism (Routledge 2009); Parveen Feroze Hassan, The Political Philosophy of Iqbal (Publishers United 1970).
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Iqbal’s concrete political gestures from ca. 1930 to 1938 reveal, as this article will show,
that his boyish flirtations with universalism––both in the shape of sharia law and
Anglo-American approaches to liberal constitutionalism––ultimately gave way to
a more tangible and homely outlook on the constitutional scaffolding of a future
Islamic Republic in India.
In scholarly writings on South Asian constitutionalism––defined here as thinking about
the preconditions for and the limitations of the exercise of sovereign power––and in the
historiography of South Asia more broadly, political thought has largely taken a back seat.
That political thought has been pushed to the margins of scholarship is hardly surprising.
Open a text book onmodern South Asia and chances are that it will be centrally concerned
with the themes of partition and nation-building. If the textbook has taken the Oedipal turn
from ancestor worship to Vatermord, it is likely to adopt the stereotypes drawn up by the
old Cambridge School or the historians of the post-colonial consortium. You will find here
a rather cool assessment of the founding fathers. They enter the narrative largely as self-
interested office seekers––the infamous “mimic men”, who clumsily imitate their colonial
masters––or as hybridized “Macaulay’s bastards”, men who were middle-class, middle-
aged, and for all practical purposes, middle-minded. By shrugging off sentimental nation-
alist myths, such accounts have ably highlighted the shrewdness of politicians. Yet they
have done little to assess the quality of their thought, be it political or otherwise.
In this article, I provide an initial glimpse into what Iqbal’s preconditions and limitations
for the exercise of sovereign power looked like. The linguistic, cultural and ethnic diversity
amongst Muslims in India hampered Iqbal to plunge straight into a technical debate of
balancing legislative dos and don’ts. Iqbal first had to think about who the people were that
would inhabit his conceptual blueprint of an Islamic democracy. I argue, that Iqbal did this by
patching together a new republican subjectivity. This novel vision ofman lay at the heart of his
political and legal philosophy. Iqbal then confronted issues of constitutional and legal change,
making an intriguing case, as I go on to show, for somewhat unorthodox principles of
transformation from Islamic legal science. After focusing on the individual and the theoretical
foundations of constitutional transformation, Iqbal pondered at length over how to fold
India’sMuslims into a single nation. In all of this, Iqbal’s engagementwith theAhmadis, a tiny
Muslim reformist sect from Qadian, provides instructive insights to illuminate Iqbal’s
position.
These steps are not as neatly separable as the structure of my article suggests. They do
overlap and even conflict with one another. The following division into neatly demarcated
spaces is still helpful, however, for conceptual clarity. I will therefore take these divisions as
a rough guide to walk through the main spheres of Iqbal’s constitutionalism: character and
individuality, law and politics and finally, solidarity and community.
Part I: character
In late December 1929, at the 44th All India National Congress meeting in Lahore,
Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Congress president, assured Indian Muslims that no “future
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constitution will be acceptable to the Congress that does not give full satisfaction” to
minorities.13 Roughly a year earlier, a committee which Nehru chaired had proposed to
smash the fragile agreements struck between the Muslim League and the Congress, the
so-called Lucknow Pact of 1916.14 The Pact enshrined separate electorates for mino-
rities, weightage, and provincial autonomy.15 Nehru’s radical proposition to swap this
delicate agreement with the standard liberal dictum that each citizen’s vote should
count evenly in the nascent constitution of an Indian Republic, triggered severe anxiety
amongst Muslims. They feared an independent India would orphan religious minorities
and put them under the irrevocable custody of a Hindu majority.
As Hindus vastly outnumbered all other communities, Muslims feared, that in Nehru’s
India the democratic number game would be eternally skewed to their disadvantage. On
31 December 1928, a Muslim emergency conference was hastily organized to respond to
the Nehru Committee’s constitutional recommendations. One of the most luminous
Muslim intellectuals, Muhammad Ali Jauhar, broke down the report’s content in memor-
able brevity: “The creation is God’s; the country is Viceroy’s; and the rule is Hindu
Mahasabha Bahadur’s [a Hindu nationalist movement]”.16
Iqbal was in line with this feeling. Parliamentary representation on a numeric basis was
not suitable for India. In a response to the colonial government’s critique that “British
democratic sentiments” sat uneasy with the added weightage given to Muslims through
separate electorates, Iqbal rebutted from the podium of the Muslim League’s 25th annual
gathering in Allahabad, that “British democracy cannot be of any use in a land of many
nations”.17 Instead, Iqbal bolstered the claim for constitutionally grounded minority safe-
guards. A majority community could not brush over minority demands. The one-man-one
-vote dogma was, according to Iqbal, only “theoretically correct, if we start from Western
premises”.18 On 6 December 1933, in a statement defending the staunch position adopted
by Muslim delegates at the Round Table Conference regarding constitutional minority
safeguards, Iqbal explained that the averageMuslim cheered for “safeguards not because he
is afraid of democracy but because he has reason to be afraid of communal oligarchy in the
13India National Congress, Report of the 44th Annual Session Held at Lajpat Nagar Lahore (The Reception Committee
1930) 60. The famous Independence Resolution was also passed at this meeting. In it, the Congress enticed the British
government to cede to their demands for an independent India.
14Regarding separate electorates for Muslims, the Nehru Report (as the Committee’s recommendations came to be
known) had this to say: “It is admitted by most people now that separate electorates are thoroughly bad and must be
done away with. We find however that there has been a tendency amongst the Muslims to consider them as
a ‘valued privilege’… Everybody knows that separate electorates are bad for the growth of a national spirit but
everybody perhaps does not realise equally well that separate electorates are still worse for a minority community.
They make the majority wholly independent of the minority and its votes and usually hostile to it.”: The Committee
Appointed by the All Parties’ Conference 1928, Report 30 (1928).
15A solid critique of the Lucknow Pact from the viewpoint of other minority communities, who would have to shoulder
much of the brunt, was brought forward by BR Ambedkar, one of the makers of the Indian Constitution: “The
principal defect in the Lucknow Pact is that in allotting the seats to the Mohamedans it did not take into
consideration the effect it will have upon other interests. The framers of the pact, as pointed out by the
Government of India, failed to remember that whatever advantage is given to the Mohamedans is taken away
from some other interest or interests.”: Vasant Moon and Hari Narke (eds), Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and
Speeches Vol II (2nd edn, Dr Ambedkar Foundation 2014) 371.
16Hafizur Rehman (ed), Report of the All-India Muslim Conference held at Delhi on 31st December 1928, and 1st
January 1929 (1930) 33.
17The League’s entire Allahabad session can be found in: Nripendra Nath Mitra (ed), The Indian Annual Register 1930 Vol.
II (The Annual Register Office 1932) 343.
18ibid.
INDIAN LAW REVIEW 139
garb of democracy in India.” For Iqbal Muslims were merely striving “to ensure the
substance of democracy even at the expense of its conventional form.”19
In Iqbal’s Muslim democracy, a specific character endowed political participation. As he
elaborated in a short article for the Allahabad-based magazine The New Era, “every human
being is the centre of latent power, the possibilities of which can be developed by cultivating
a certain type of character”.20 In contrast to European democracies, Iqbal contended, which
had originated as a political backdrop tomop up the spills from “the economic regeneration
of European societies”, citizenship in India was not hinged upon the fact of Indians
becoming economically efficient, or, for that matter, men of letters.21 It was futile to
mimic the European model of focusing on economic uplift first and on political rights
later. Rather, in Iqbal’s telling, a specific Muslim character with enough khudi could burst
open what we now call the “waiting room of history”, which is postcolonial shorthand for
locking colonial subjects into a prison of eternal tutelage; lulling them in with the hypnotic
tune that one day they will be mature enough to acquire self-rule.22
A stone throw away from the Congress’s Lajpat Nagar proceedings, thousands ofMuslims
had gathered in the largest cemetery of the city, the Miani Sahib Graveyard. They were
burying Ilmuddin, a convicted murderer.23 A few weeks earlier, Ilmuddin had been executed
for stabbing and fatally wounding the publisher of Rangila Rasul, a foamy booklet that
thundered against the prophetMuhammad.24 Ilmuddin had been buried before. Immediately
after his court sentenced execution, the British authorities buried Ilmuddin in the Mianwali
jail cemetery. This was unacceptable for Iqbal. He lobbied tirelessly for what he called the
“earnest” and “legitimate desire” of Indian Muslims to have Ilmuddin’s body unearthed and
transferred to Lahore.25 The Governor of the Punjab eventually caved. He cited law and order
issues for his earlier reluctance to approve the move, only to witness one of the largest funeral
proceedings in Lahore’s modern history.26 For Iqbal, Ilmuddin’s character was a fine example
for how the concept of individuality (khudi) played out in real life.
This was not the first time Iqbal had spotted khudi of Ilmuddin’s magnitude. In one
of his earliest works, published in the September 1900 edition of The Indian Antiquary,
Iqbal rebelled against the standard view that Muslim philosophy was essentially “an
unprogressive repetition of Aristotle and Plato”.27 The Islamic philosophy Iqbal knew
was full of “originality”.28 In his short article, Iqbal lionized spiritual experiences against
the abstract and cold rationality of utilitarianism, and––similarly to Mill, who after an
overdose of Bentham sought refuge in Coleridge––ventured outwards to identify
19Shamloo (ed), Speeches and Statements of Iqbal (Al-Manār Academy 1944) 194.
20Muhammad Iqbal, ‘Notes on Muslim Democracy’ The New Era (Allahabad, 28 July 1916) 251.
21ibid.
22Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued that historicism, which means endowing history with a purpose and aim, in Mill’s eyes
“consigned Indians, Africans and other ‘rude nations’ to an imaginary waiting room of history.” But Dipesh
Chakrabarty goes a little overboard when he brazenly concludes “That was what historicist consciousness was:
a recommendation to the colonized to wait”. See, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought
and Historical Difference (Princeton University Press 2000) 8.
23Letter from the Government of India Home Department to the Under Secretary of State for India (21 November 1929).
24Ilam Din v Emperor AIR 1930 Lah 157 (High Court (HC)).
25Letter from the Government of India Home Department to the Under Secretary of State for India (n 23).
26The Tribune’s correspondent called the gathering “unprecedented”. ‘Ilmuddin’s Body Brought to Lahore’ The Tribune
(Lahore, 15 November 1929).




enlightened Muslims able to substantiate his conviction that there really was
a “standard higher than intellect itself”.29 Iqbal found these characteristics personified
in what he then described as “the profoundest theologian among modern Indian
Muhammadans”,30 an elderly saint named Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.
Ahmad had become a household name amongst Indian Muslims in the late nineteenth
century for debating Christian missionaries and Hindu revivalists and for establishing his
own religious sect, the Ahmadiyya.31 In a spectacular East-West mélange, Ahmad had
claimed that he was the rebirth of Jesus and of Krishna and Vishnu. After initial criticism to
these claims, Ahmad doubled down and claimed shadowy prophethood as well. What
made such fundamentally different characters like Ghulam Ahmad, a God-man of solid
religious training, and Ilmuddin, an 18-year old carpenter with no formal education at all,
subject to Iqbal’s admiration was not their intellectual heft. Instead, Iqbal applauded their
zealous will to embrace individuality and use it to canalize their energies for the defence of
India’s Muslims. Endorsing a can-do mentality over intellectualism, Iqbal writes in the
Allahabad journal Hindustan Review in 1909, that “the essential nature of man consists in
will, not intellect or understanding.”32
Individuality, in something close to its contemporary form, first appeared as a concept in
the nineteenth-century.33 As Muslims recovered from the shock of the Mughal crown’s
abolishment, they were hard pressed to find explanations as to why the rulership of their
religious fellowmen had abruptly ended after 400 years. Most modernists exculpated Islam
and blamed backward thinking for having weakened Muslim claims to sovereignty.34 The
refusal of Muslims to embrace enlightenment reason wholeheartedly, they analyzed, had
excluded them from the spoils of scientific progress. Syed Ahmed Khan, a tremendously
impactful nineteenth century Muslim reformer, summed up this feeling crudely when he
roared that Indians were little more than “dirty animals” and “imbecile brutes”who needed
firm drill if they wanted to rival “able and handsome” Europeans.35
A fresh view on the individual within the framework of religion, Syed Ahmed Khan
wagered, would usher rapid economic and moral uplift. Syed Ahmed Khan’s hopes rested
on the young. After Sir Syed, as he was known to friends, established the Muhammadan
Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh, his harsh assessment of Indians softened considerably.
Inspecting the boarding rooms of the students, Sir Syed recounted that he was “charmed
with the way in which they were fitted up. Each youth furnishes his chambers after his own
29ibid.
30ibid 239.
31See, Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background
(Oxford University Press 2003) 255; AR Dard, Life of Ahmad: Founder of the Ahmadiyya Movement (Islam International
Publications 2008) 156.
32Muhammad Iqbal, ‘Islam as a Moral and Political Ideal’ (1909) 20 Hindustan Review 29, 32.
33This point is heavily contested. Indian philosophy has not shied away from confronting the concept of selfhood. In
the context of conceiving an individual human agent as the vehicle for both constant self-improvement and societal
change, however, it seems more apt to acknowledge modernity’s profound rupture instead of clinging on to accounts
that favour frictionless continuity. The tension between both views turns shrill in historical accounts of Indian
nationalism, with Robinson defending the primordial view and Jalal endorsing a modernist reading: Francis
Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The politics of the United Provinces’ Muslims 1860–1923 (Cambridge
University Press 1974); Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan
(Cambridge University Press 1994).
34For an insightful study on the strategies that Indian Muslims adopted to cope with the displacement of Mughal rule,
see Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge University Press 1972).
35Syed Ahmed Khan made these remarks in a travelogue he wrote during his journey through Europe in 1870. See, GFI
Graham, The Life and Work of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (William Blackwood and Sons 1885) 184.
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taste, and there is the same individuality about each that one finds in an Eton boy’s room.”36
No different than in orthodox liberalism, early Indian modernists attempted to solve the
social question in India by increasing individual efficiency. These motives were also picked
up by Muslim intellectuals in the twentieth century.
Iqbal absorbed the basic modernist stance to revitalize the individual and strive
towards productivity. Yet Iqbal distinguished himself from the conventional modernist
trot. In a conservative counterblow, Iqbal alleged that the modernists rhetoric of
efficiency was undermining culture.37 Modernists had busied themselves with aping
British mannerism and thereby jeopardized their own tradition. While Iqbal conceded
that there was good in modern knowledge, it was crucial to approach Western knowl-
edge with a “respectful but independent attitude”.38
Iqbal held that the best way to negotiate modernity’s stormy arrival was to spark the
potential of resistance into individuality. The individuality Iqbal promoted was there-
fore dynamic and oozed of immediate action. The German governess of Iqbal’s two
children, who assisted him throughout the 1930s, was stunned by the tension between
Iqbal’s ailing body and his upbeat message of vitalism. On one occasion, Aunty Doris,
as Iqbal’s children affectionately called her, remembered that Iqbal was too weak to
even lift a pen, yet asked her to conclude a letter to a Dacca-based Muslim student
group with the energetic words: “Fight! For in fight there is life.”39
Eastern thinkers, Iqbal decried, had for too long praised otherworldly bliss. In some
cases, he lamented, Eastern thinkers had gone so far as to renounce the material world
altogether, faulting it as a prolonged act of aggression. Once these thinkers had rebuffed
the material world, they moved on to the lush playgrounds of neo-Platonic metaphy-
sics. But their lengthy dwelling in metaphysical heights had fattened them. Worse still,
the sojourn in Plato’s welcoming lounge, for Iqbal little more than a faux “quest after
a nameless nothing”, had robbed Muslims of the potential to tackle the precarious
material conditions that surrounded them.40
In extreme cases, like in the Sufi tariqas, metaphysics had wholesomely consumed
Muslim lives and stripped them of even their faintest ability to act. In his short
treatise Islam and Mysticism, Iqbal eerily describes the Muslims condition as floating
“aimlessly in the dusky valleys of Hellenic-Persian Mysticism, which teaches us to shut
our eyes to the hard Reality around, and to fix our gaze on what it describes as
‘Illuminations’––blue, red and yellow Reality springing from the cells of an overworked
brain”.41 In Iqbal’s telling, this “self-mystification” and this “seeking Reality in quarters
where it does not exist”, was a form of nihilism and intellectualism, which clearly
indicated “the decadence of the Muslims world”.42
Iqbal therefore sloshed all metaphysical thinking with the blame of hampering the
potential for his version of individuality. Indian Muslims were living in miserable
36ibid 330.
37For instance, Iqbal writes: “Our education does not recognise man as a problem, it impresses on us the visible fact of
multiplicity without giving us an insight into the inner unity of life, and thus tends tomake us more andmore immersed in
our physical environment. The soul of man is left untouched and the result is a superficial knowledge with a mere illusion
of culture and freedom.”: Muhammad Iqbal, ‘The Inner Synthesis of Life’ (1926) 27 Indian Review 2.
38Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (n 11) 93.
39Doris Ahmad, Iqbal as I Knew Him (Iqbal Academy Pakistan 1986) 8.
40Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (n 11) 86.
41Muhammad Iqbal, ‘Islam and Mysticism’ The New Era (Allahabad, 27 July 1916) 250.
42ibid.
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conditions; yet boozed from the sweet nectar of metaphysics they could not recognize
the material mess of their precarious existence. Iqbal loathed this Eastern quietism. To
counter this alleged paralysis Iqbal’s poetic and philosophical tracts strive to amplify the
“latent power” of individuality that dwells in every Muslim and which, if pitched high
enough, makes “Muslim Democracy” and political participation a concrete utopia.43
Part II: law
The colonial legal order destabilized native forms of adjudication from roughly the
1860s.44 To soften the blow of galloping legal reforms and to weigh in the cultural
specificities of Indian societies, the colonial government decided to cater to religious
groups.45 In personal law matters, the government animated religious groups to admin-
ister their own norms. Though semi-permeable, this doctrine later came to be known as
the doctrine of non-intervention.46 Laws open to self-regulation related mainly to
marriages, succession, inheritance, divorce, alimony, charity and so on. In this way,
a lot of the political thinking of India’s public men was diverted into the legal sphere.
Amongst India’s Muslims, legal debates flared typically around the correct interpreta-
tion of Anglo-Muhammadan Law, a narrow collection of Islamic legal guidelines and
rules, horded together by nineteenth century Muslim modernists and Western
Orientalists.47
Muslims squabbled over what school of interpretation to follow. Iqbal largely
avoided such debates and proclaimed instead that all prevailing methodologies to
squash meaning from Islamic Law were outdated and stale. They were in desperate
need of fresh inputs. Iqbal thus reduced the legal problem Indian Muslims wrestled
with to a simple catchphrase: “while people are moving the law remains stationary”.48
No longer could jurists rely on a systematic reconstruction of written norms based on
analogy and precedent (qiyas), the preferred method of Muslim legists, irrespective of
how carefully measured their efforts were. Instead, Iqbal proposed, jurists should
examine the prevalent mood and the ever-shifting reverberations within society.
Indian Muslims could develop this heightened sensitivity to current societal issues by
swinging open the door to ijtihad, a classic method for deriving legitimacy of legal
codes through the establishment of a wide consensus amongst learned theologians,
a process called ijma. In Iqbal’s telling, electing representatives to an exclusively Muslim
43Iqbal, ‘Notes on Muslim Democracy’ (n 20) 251.
44See only, Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism (Princeton University Press
2010); Elisabeth Kolsky, Colonial Justice in British India: White Violence and the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press
2010); Radhika Singha, A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India (Oxford University Press 1998).
45Bernard Cohn famously taunted the British for their severe “epistemological failures” in “understanding Indian
society” and religion fully. See, Bernard S Cohn, ‘From Indian Status to British Contract’ (1961) 21 The Journal of
Economic History 628.
46This non-intervention policy, according to the political theorist Partha Chatterjee, catalyzed the growth of nationalist
thought in the religious sphere. Chatterjee’s reading of colonialism depicts profound structural similarities with the
German historian Reinhart Koselleck’s bleak account of the French Revolution. See, Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist
Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (Zed Books for the United Nations University 1986) 1–54.
47Scholarship has picked up on the notion that Anglo-Muhammadan Law was not just a rigid set of rules but that it
also opened new spaces for debate and social change: See Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary
Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton University Press 2002); Muhammad Zubair Abbasi, ‘Islamic Law and Social
Change: An Insight into the Making of Anglo-Muhammadan Law’ (2014) 25 Journal of Islamic Studies 325.
48Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (n 11) 161.
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parliament and endowing them with the power to exercise ijtihad, would allow Muslims
to swiftly reform and cure their jurisprudential woes. But some of the laws Iqbal
ventured to transform were of divine origin. This complicated Iqbal’s reformist agenda.
Iqbal had to make the difficult argument in how far sharia law could be pressed into
a modern constitutional shape, without depleting its content.
How Iqbal handled this conceptual problem is best exemplified by looking at his
direct interventions into Anglo-Muhammadan law. There were a number of cases that
excited Iqbal. Amongst Iqbal’s prime concerns were cases that touched upon the
divorce right for Muslim women. Under Anglo-Muhammadan Law it was close to
impossible for women to seek separation from their husbands, even more so if the
husband was unwilling. Muslim women from the 1920s onwards thus hopped on a legal
provision reluctantly penned in a standard reference work of Anglo-Muhammadan
Law, a legal textbook with the self-assured title The Personal Law of the Mohamedans
According to All the Schools. Composed in the late nineteenth century by the liberal
reformer Syed Ameer Ali, the book listed extreme circumstances under which mar-
riages collapsed.
One of these extraordinary conditions that instantly shattered a marriage contract was
apostasy, the formal disaffiliation from Islam. In the words of Ameer Ali, for Anglo-
Muhammadan law “apostasy has the effect to dissolving the marriage-tie between the
parties”.49 Just like major swathes of Anglo-Muhammadan Law, this legal opinion too
was picked from the medieval legal manual Hedaya, a reference work heavily cited in
colonial courtrooms around that time. In Hedaya one finds that “if either husband or wife
apostatize from the faith, a separation takes place without divorce”.50
But Hedaya’s was not the only legal opinion in circulation. Judges who based their
rulings on Hanafi fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), a Sunni school of law prevalent in India,
made the case that it had always been permissible for Muslim men to wed across
religions. There was no prohibition for men to marry women who followed a religion
based on a divine book. For instance, when a woman converted during wedlock to
Christianity, her marriage tie to her Muslim husband would continue to remain intact,
as the Christian faith was inspired by a divine book. The counter-view highlighted that
the explosive act of apostasy ruptured interpersonal relationship between spouses so
severely, that it could hardly be compared to a marriage in full knowledge of the
spouses’ religion.
In one of these cases in the early 1930s, Maryam Bibi, a “young Muslim woman”
from Jullundur, rushed into conversion to free herself from an unhappy marriage with
Sardar Mohammad. Against Maryam Bibi’s repeated appeals, Sardar had married
a second wife. Maryam Bibi first moved back in with her parents. When Sardar sued
Maryam Bibi for the restitution of their conjugal bond, she converted to Christianity.
The ruling judge found that “there was little doubt that Maryam Bibi… was prompted
only by the desire to bring about the dissolution of marriage, when she renounced her
religion and became a Christian”, but continued that this was not “a matter of any
consequence”. So far as the decision of the present appeal was concerned “a person may
49Syed Ameer Ali, The Personal Law of the Mohamedans According to All the Schools (WH Allen & Co 1880) 276.
50Standish Grove Grady (ed), The Hedaya, or Guide: A Commentary on the Mussulman Laws (Charles Hamilton tr, 2nd
edn, WH Allen & Co 1870) 66.
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embrace a particular religion in order to benefit from a worldly point of view”. As long
as the “conversion is genuine” even “sordid motives” would not affect the ruling.51
That Muslim women had to abandon Islam as the only feasible path to leave their
husbands was intolerable for Iqbal. In Iqbal’s eyes, it also distorted what Islamic Law
was about. Islamic law, as Iqbal understood it, encouraged a constant rethinking of its
elementary principles with the ultimate objective to secure justice. The founders of the
various schools of Islamic jurisprudence, Iqbal asserted, never claimed “finality for their
reasonings and interpretations”.52 The present generation of “Muslim liberals” was
therefore free to “re-interpret the foundational legal principles, in the light of their
own experience and the altered conditions of modern life”.53 Addressing the issues of
women in Punjab directly, Iqbal warned that for “a missionary religion” like Islam it
was anathema to shove “Muslim women wishing to get rid of undesirable husbands”
into apostasy. The interpretation “laid down in the Hedaya”, according to Iqbal, had
blatantly failed the test to “protect the interests of the Faith”.54
The “modern Hanafi legists had eternalised the interpretations of the founders and
his immediate followers”, Iqbal continued more forcefully, as opposed to preserving the
spirit and “interest of the Faith”.55 For Iqbal, the reliance on precedent and analogy had
spiralled into a crippling paralysis in India. Yet Iqbal was hopeful that the stagnant legal
spirit of India’s Muslims could be reanimated. Through “fresh interpretations of the
foundational principles” of Islamic Law, Iqbal advocated, Muslim societies could stir
legal reform by redirecting their efforts to unravel the true purpose behind the laws. In
modern times, Iqbal held, this process of scrubbing open the law’s truth could only take
a republican shape. Therefore, the most sensible way was to transfer “the power of
ijtihad from individual representatives of schools to a Muslim legislative assembly”.56
Iqbal first addressed the idea of a Muslim Republic in an early 1908 essay titled
Political Thought in Islam, which appeared in the first volume of The Sociological
Review, the quarterly publication of the Sociological Society.57 The journal escorted
the newly established chair for Sociology at the University of London. In the first issue
of the journal, Leonard Hobhouse, the incumbent, attempted to pacify the warring
fronts on the meaning of sociology with appeasing statements like, “it is precisely the
most elementary aspects that remain longest in the dark” and that sociologists “can only
know what we are looking for when we have found it”.58 Nestled between academic
articles on “The Definition of Magic”, “The Tutelage of Races”, and “Chelsea, Past and
Possible”, Iqbal outlined the role of the caliphate in Islamic governance structures.
There had never been a caliphate in India. Yet the downfall of the Ottoman caliphate
after the First World War, galvanized massive rallies in India with loud calls for British
intervention to protect the caliph’s throne.59 Iqbal was tepid towards this so-called
Khilafat-movement. As Iqbal laid out roughly a decade before the Khilafat-movement
51Sardar Mohammad v Mt Maryam Bibi AIR 1936 Lah 666 (HC).
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59For a masterful reconstruction of the Khilafat movement, see Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism
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gained steam, “[f]rom a legal standpoint, the Caliph does not occupy any privileged
position. In theory, he is like other members of the Commonwealth. He can be directly
sued in any ordinary law court”.60 The caliph, Iqbal elaborated, is “open to the criticism
of every Muslim.”61 Since the caliph was not “the representative of God on earth”, or
a “source of law”, Iqbal concluded, “the elector has the right to demand the deposition
of the Caliph”.62
Consequently then, for Iqbal “there is no privileged class, no priesthood, no caste
system” as far as the law is concerned.63 A Muslim Republic bases itself in the “absolute
equality of all Muslims in the eyes of the law”.64 In Iqbal’s view, the “entire fabric of
Islamic law” was composed of “judge-made law”, where “the lawyer performs the
legislative function in the Muslim constitution”.65 But modernity’s acceleration of
time now demanded quick solutions to an increasing number of unforeseen legal
problems. Muslims could no longer rely on judges and lawyers alone to solve their
legal issues. Instead, they had to tap the “source of law”, which for Iqbal rested in “the
will of the whole Muslim community” and which could be made audible through
a “general council”.66
Iqbal posited his view of legal modernism against the Turkish liberal Ziya Gökalp,
who promoted a positivist reading of law and a radical break from clericalism. In The
Programme of Turkism, Gökalp sketches his legal project with the following words: “all
provisions existing in our laws that are contrary to liberty, equality, and justice, and all
traces of theocracy and clericalism should be completely eliminated”.67 Gökalp’s view
derived rights from these standard political abstractions and puffed life into them
through democratic procedures. But for Iqbal, Muslims already possessed the latent
powers that endowed them with the potential for making laws, and therefore could
march straight to fixing social mishaps, skipping, as it were, the prescribed detour
through liberal metaphysics of rationality.
Iqbal’s endorsement for legal reform on the issue of women’s rights did not go
unnoticed. In 1933, Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi of Darul uloom Deoband, a major
religious seminary in North India, published a lengthy fatwa (legal opinion) on divorce
rights for Muslim women called al-Hilat al Najiza lil Hailat al Ajiza (Successful Legal
Strategies for Helpless Wives). Thanvi commenced with a warning. There was a grave
risk, he claimed, in awarding divorce rights to women. It was common knowledge,
Thanvi slithered, that women are “deficient in intellect”. To neutralize this alleged
danger the right to divorce for women required “certain restrictions”.68 The best
move for women to get a divorce, Thanvi advised, was to insist on a specific divorce
clause in their marriage contracts. In so doing, the man’s right to seek separation could
be conveyed to the woman. Yet Thanvi cautioned that this right should never be







67Niyazi Berkes (ed & tr), Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp (Columbia
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transferred wholesomely. It was much better if the woman named at least two guardians
who would, in case of a marital dispute, confirm that there the marriage had indeed
collapsed and should be resolved.
To provide women and their guardians with rough guidelines on when separation
could be legitimately sought, Thanvi came up with the following list: when the “man is
cruel and negligent”; “he fails to provide for the woman’s maintenance,”; “ignores the
needs of the wife and children”; “travels to foreign lands and leaves no trace or means
of contact”; “turns out to be impotent”, or, if none of the above apply, is simply
“inflicted with the disease of madness”.69 Iqbal concurred with Thanvi’s view in so
far that Indian Muslims had to take measured steps to produce a legal sphere more
hospitable to women and stop edging them outside of the Muslim religious fold.
Iqbal also placed conceptual hurdles on legal reform. One of them was the principle
of tauhid, which roughly translates to the one-ness or unity of Allah and constitutes the
bedrock of monotheism. For Iqbal, this affirmation of Allah’s singularity translated
directly into an airy global ethical sphere. In Iqbal’s telling, a culturally and ethnically
diverse Muslim ummah was not at liberty to abolish a limited set of ritual practices that
united them; for instance, to perform the obligatory prayers in the Arabic language.
In 1932, news reached India that the Young Turks planned to change this aspect of
the Islamic ritual prayer. To strengthen nationalist sentiments, the Young Turks had
allegedly decided that the ritual prayers now ought to be publicly performed in the
Turkish language. Iqbal emerged as an early critic of this move. He regarded it as
a backward step. On 16 February 1931, in an interview given to the Lahori newspaper
The Light, Iqbal laid out his reasons for disagreeing with Mustafa Kemal, the secularist
leader of the Turkish reform movement. Islam, Iqbal explained, was not merely con-
cerned with the “individual conscience” but strove to raise the collective conscience of
a given society so that it may partake in a “universal society”. To conduct the “Muslim
prayer in the Turkish language” was to slap a linguistic and “national significance” on
Islam, which would be closer to the way “pre-Islamic ancient people” thought.70
For Iqbal the congregational prayer in Arabic, the “language of the revelation”,
united all Muslims into an ethical “world institution” and nourished a “uniform
attitude of mind”. For non-Arabs it was altogether dispensable to understand the
Arabic verses uttered during prayer. As Iqbal puts it, “the intelligibility of language,
though helpful in securing the uniformity of mind” was of “secondary importance”
only.71 In the congregational prayer, man cultivated the ideal of a “world society”, and
therefore the prayer “must always be in the Arabic language the world over”.72 Such
a uniformly minded world society may one day well rival, Iqbal declared during
a speech at a public meeting of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League on
27 July 1937, “the Anglo-French institution miscalled League of Nations”.73
Against the League of Nations, Iqbal posited the idea of an “Eastern League of
Nations”, whose success, Iqbal believed, would rest upon the eradication of the national
69ibid 508.
70Muhammad Iqbal, ‘On Turkish Prayer’ The Light (Lahore, 16 February 1932).
71ibid.
72ibid.
73Iqbal was disgusted by what he saw happening in Palestine, where, as he put it, “rocky desert plus cash” was offered
to the Arabs and all “the rich land to the Jews”. See Shamloo (n 19) 198, 199.
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superiority myth.74 To achieve this Eastern League of Nations, every Muslim nation
first had to shake off colonial subjugation and “sink into her own deeper self”, until “all
are strong and powerful to form a living family of republics”. This “true and living
unity” was manifested “in a multiplicity of free independent units whose racial rival-
ries”, Iqbal elbowed against the League of Nations “are adjusted and harmonized by the
unifying bond of a common spiritual aspiration”.75 Equipped with these principles
Muslims could, Iqbal broadcasted during an otherwise gloomy New Year speech from
Lahore’s All-India Radio station on 1 January 1938, wreck this “so-called democracy,
this accursed nationalism and this degraded imperialism”.76
Part III: politics
The second conceptual limitation Iqbal introduced to contour his constitutionalism was
more earthly. It related to khatm-e-nubuwwat, the belief that Muhammad is mankind’s
last prophet. While the subject of khatm-e-nubuwwat had enthused some theological
fissures around the status and role of Muhammad, it had yet to gain salience in legal
debates.77 If at all, Muslim legists had discussed khatam-e-nubuwwat on abstract
scholarly terms without any immediate legal implications. For Iqbal, the legal implica-
tions of the finality of prophethood were “extremely important”.78 The concept deter-
mined the individual’s suitability to participate in a Muslim nation and related directly
to questions of constitutional loyalty. Iqbal developed this notion from the historical
background of the Kashmir liberation movement. By reconstituting the Kashmir
Committee and barring Ahmadis from joining it, as long as they were not willed to
abandon the community’s caliph, Iqbal created a convenient benchmark for national
belonging that pressed most Indian Muslims into a single political fraternity.
On 25 July 1931, the Unionist leader Fazl-i-Husain invited a group of Muslim
landowners and, for good measure, a number of intellectuals, to his summer retreat
in Shimla. Fazl-i-Husain wanted to talk about Kashmiri Muslims. The princely state of
Kashmir consisted of an overwhelmingly Muslim population but through diplomatic
elephant-trading in the aftermath of the British conquest in 1846, had been sold to
a Hindu raja. Eighty years on, Kashmiri Muslims still grappled for self-determination
and felt their movement was receiving little support from Indian Muslims living in
richer provinces. To change this situation, Fazl-i-Husain proposed to streamline resis-
tance efforts. In order to achieve this, Fazl-i-Husain advocated for a complete makeover
of the defunct All India Kashmir Committee, which had been in existence for some
decades but so far largely failed to provide any noteworthy assistance to Kashmir’s
Muslims.79 For the presidency of the new Committee, Fazl-i-Husain had Iqbal in mind.
Fazl-i-Husain considered Iqbal to be a uniting figure for Indian Muslims.80
74Shamloo (n 19) 199.
75Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (n 11) 151–53.
76Shamloo (n 19) 146.
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Yet during the deliberations, Iqbal surprisingly proposed Mirza Mahmud, a son of
Ghulam Ahmad and the caliph of the Ahmadiyya, to lead the Committee.81 Iqbal even
convinced the other attendees that Mirza Mahmud was the right man for the position,
and that apart from providing much-needed financial support, he could use his agile
Ahmadiyya movement to establish stable organizational structures that would help
Kashmiris in their fight for political participation.82 After Mahmud was elected, Iqbal
remained closely attached to the Committee. The issue of Kashmir formed the corner-
stone of Iqbal’s presidential address at the All India Muslim conference in Lahore on
21 March 1932. In this speech Iqbal argued that the “growing self-consciousness in
people all over the world” was now “demanding recognition” to participate in the
“administration which govern them”.83 Iqbal highlighted that the fight for the political
participation of “Kashmiris was absolutely just”.84 Since khudi had crushed the waiting
room of history, Kashmir’s Muslims were freed to undergo “political tutelage” before
determining their own political future in “some kind of popular assembly”.85
On 4 May 1933, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad was forced to resign from office. A large
group within the Kashmir Committee refused to carry on under his leadership. They
demanded the introduction of a proper constitutional framework, in which the pre-
sident of the committee should be held accountable for his actions.86 The Majlis-
e-Ahrar, a religious outlet which gained prominence for its harsh opposition towards
the Ahmadiyya and which remained closely aligned to the Congress, took the agitation
a step further. They called for a complete boycott of the Committee.87 Shortly after
Mahmud Ahmad resigned, Iqbal was appointed interim president of the Committee.88
On 20 June 1933, Iqbal also stepped down from the presidency. In his letter of
resignation, Iqbal clarified his reasons. He could not continue as president with the
Committee in its current shape. Iqbal felt surrounded by too many Ahmadi members
who would openly refuse to obey his command.89 Any efforts to implement a fresh
constitution for the Committee, more democratic in its spirit and “thoroughly repre-
sentative [in] character”, Iqbal vented, had repeatedly been frustrated by the Ahmadis.90
Their reluctance to support him, Iqbal declared, proved beyond doubt that Ahmadi
loyalty was tied more to their caliph and not to the head of the political association they
participated in.91 In Iqbal’s reading, this made Ahmadis by default disloyal subjects
under any constitutional structure. The Ahmadis’ “obedience to the command of their
religious leader”, for Iqbal, hindered them to follow administrative orders that came
from any constitutional authority.92
81Adil Hussain Khan, ‘The Kashmir Crisis as a Political Platform for Jama’at-i-Ahmadiyya’s Entrance into South Asian
Politics’ (2012) 46 Modern Asian Studies 1401.
82Ian Copland, ‘Islam and Political Mobilization in Kashmir, 1931–34’ (1981) 54 Pacific Affairs 231.
83Shamloo (n 19) 40.
84ibid.
85ibid 41.
86Letter from Fazl-i-Husain to Zafrullah Khan (26 June 1933) cited in Waheed Ahmad (ed), Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain
(Research Society of Pakistan 1976) 310.
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The reasons for his opposition to Ahmadis provide a window into the kind of
modern republic Iqbal had thought out for Indian Muslims. The peculiar design of
Ahmadi rules of succession and governance––which Iqbal labelled sectarian, backward,
archaic, and entirely at odds with the modern juridico-political institution of ijtihad––
even threatened to fragment the political fraternity of Indian Muslims itself.93 While
there was little friction between Mahmud Ahmad and Iqbal on the practical steps to be
taken to assist Kashmir’s Muslims in their quest for liberation, according to Iqbal,
Mahmud Ahmad had violated the formal procedures of the presidency and thereby
shattered the trust as a reliable partner. For Iqbal, Ahmad’s acts had rendered impos-
sible the Committee’s “smooth working” and it was thus in “the best interest of all
concerned” that “the present Kashmir Committee should cease to exist”.94 But this was
not a death blow to Kashmir’s independence movement. Iqbal proposed, that Muslims
should constitute a new committee through a “public expression of popular will”.95 This
time, however, Muslims should be careful to include only such members that would
honour the prescribed constitutional procedure. All Ahmadis should be blacklisted
from joining the new committee.96
Iqbal’s ban was not intended to be permanent. On 2 October 1933, Iqbal wrote to
Mahmud Ahmad that he should publicly renounce his “dictatorial” demeanour and
further promise that Ahmadi “allegiance will not be divided” between religious and
political authorities.97 If these declarations were made, Iqbal would consider to relax the
strict ban on Ahmadis.98 Just as the Young Turks had to depose of their caliph in order
for the public will to crystallize in an elected assembly, Iqbal held that Indian Muslims
too had to revisit the status of their religious authorities. The unrestrained power of the
Ahmadiyya’s caliph, Iqbal pinpointed, lay in Ghulam Ahmad’s claim to prophethood
and thus was a direct violation of khatam-e-nubuwwat. Perhaps Iqbal’s project was,
after all, one of secularizing Muslim institutions. His exclusion of Ahmadis could then
perhaps be regarded as a brute form of punishment for their alleged fervour to privilege
religious leadership over constitutionally bound political alliances. However, the term
“secular” falls flat here. It downplays Iqbal’s insistence to carry forward khatm-e-nabuw-
wat and tauhid, derived as they were from Devine revelation.
Yet it might be more fruitful to think of Iqbal’s constitutional project as a move towards
equality, where Islam was just a place-holder to establish a radical egalitarianism amongst
Muslims. As Iqbal penned in a letter to the British explorer Francis Younghusband:
“Bolshevism plus God is almost identical with Islam”.99 Unlike Bolshevism, however,
Iqbal’s egalitarianism was not inclusive. It was limited to Muslims. With the exclusion of
the Ahmadiyya on theological grounds, Iqbal opened up the thorny discourse on whose
claim to being a Muslim was real and whose fraudulent.
93The institutional structures of the Ahmadiyya were fundamentally reformed during the time of their second caliph,
Mirza Mahmud Ahmad. This ultimately lead to a split of the group into the Qadian and Lahore groups, with the latter
refusing to acknowledge the caliph’s leadership. The reasons for this split can be found in Muhammad Ali, The Split in
the Ahmadiyya Movement (Anhmadiyya Anjuman Isha’at Islam Lahore 1994); Bashiruddin Mahmud, Truth about the
Split (Islam International Publications 2007).
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Iqbal perceived political fraternities in conceptual rather than in territorial or genealo-
gical terms. Iqbal frowned upon Europe’s nationalism.100 For Iqbal, building a nation on
the basis of ethnicity, territory, linguistic proximity or territory was bound to end in
disaster. Such narrow and temporally contingent forms of political unities, Iqbal predicted
apocalyptically, would lead to more and greater wars, until mankind would itself “perish”
from earth.101 There were no upsides to such narrow forms of nationalism; but even if there
were, for Iqbal these flimsy alliances could never cast roots in India. The structural frame-
work out of which European political thinkers pressed their ideas of nationhood––secular-
ism and liberal democracy in particular––was so distinctly European that Iqbal ridiculed its
ambition for universality. In Iqbal’s telling, Europe’s painful entrance into the twentieth
century, with the First World War adding a new high point for violent conflicts, had laid
bare its profound “need of unity” and desire to regain the universal values that Europe once
possessed in the “universal ethics of Jesus”.102
The method in which national sentiments had been forged in Europe, Iqbal
remarked in his famous presidential address at the annual session of the All India
Muslim League held in Allahabad on 29 December 1930, would necessarily flounder in
India. India’s social structure was too complex to allow for an easy repetition of the
European script. Hinduism alone, with its emphasis on the caste system, could only
superficially stake claim to an inclusive nationalism, Iqbal dissected, but it could never
fully break free from the spell of “narrow-minded” affiliations to smaller castes and
tribes.103 Historical experience had shown, Iqbal claimed, that the various “caste-units”
were far too entrenched in the social fabric of India to be rooted out through the bubbly
rhetoric of nationalism.104 The Congress Party’s position of inclusive nationalism was
therefore doomed for failure.105
In a “united India” the starting point for nationalism, Iqbal remarked in a statement
published immediately after the Round Table Conferences on 6 December 1933, had to
take multiculturalism into account since there would always remain “the distinct
existence of more than one people in the country”.106 This was a “concrete fact”.107
Iqbal punctured the Congress Party’s ambition to “fuse the communities” of India into
a singular “biological” whole,108 with the proposition that the country should be spilt up
“on the bases of religious, historical and cultural affinities”.109 This radical step would,
Iqbal expected, solve the “questions of electorates and the communal problem in its
present form” and secure the “unity of India”.110 In his Allahabad speech, Iqbal further
stressed the demand for a separate Muslim nation state on Indian soil. Iqbal stated that
he would “like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan
100For a detailed elaboration of Iqbal’s view on European nationalism, see Sevea (n 12) 2.
101Muhammad Iqbal, Islam and Ahmadism: A Reply to Questions Raised by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru (Sh Muhammad
Ashraf 1980) 49.
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amalgamated into a single state”, which would be the “final destiny of the Muslims, at
least of North-West India”.111
Once separated, Iqbal wanted “residuary powers” to rest with these newly founded
sovereign and self-governing units. Yet he was confident that all Indian states would
immediately recognize the economic and military want for a larger regional conglom-
erate. Since there would always be “interests common to the various communities of
India”, Iqbal firmly anticipated, India’s rebirth as “a greater union of Indian states”.112
In matters of defence and the securement of borders, for instance, the sovereign units
could deploy a quota of their armed forces to the federal “Centre” and, while retaining
their own provincial armies become part of a “strong Indian Frontier Army” in this new
“Federal State”.113 The army staff would be recruited “from all provinces” and it would
be led by “experienced military men” that were drafted “from all communities”.114
For Iqbal, such a new India would be a federation of interests. As Iqbal put it, India
was a union based on “common sense”.115 Iqbal disarmed critiques by predicting that
the mere contractual nature of the new India would not dent feelings of belonging and
“patriotism”. There was no danger that one of the states would switch sides in the case
of a foreign invasion. Rather Iqbal believed that every citizen residing in the new federal
union would be driven by the “love for one’s land” and therefore always be “prepared to
make sacrifices for it”.116 When purified of its European shortcoming and cleansed
from potential violations of tauhid and the finality of prophethood, Iqbal could come to
terms with a sanitized form of nationalism.
In a heated debate with the theologian Husain Ahmad Madani, who endorsed
Muslim support for the Congress party, Iqbal linked Congress nationalism more closely
to the theological doctrines of the Ahmadiyya. At the time of the correspondence, in the
spring of 1938, Madani had been the director of the Darul uloom Deoband and the
president of its political wing, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind.117 Iqbal and Madani
exchanged views regarding a potential Hindu-Muslim alliance and the nature and
form of a united independent India.
Their main point of contention was political representation. For Madani the political
goals of Muslims and non-Muslims were largely aligned. Far more united Hindus and
Muslims than separated them. The primary unifying factor, Madani argued, was the
struggle for independence itself, with shared dreams of economic uplift hard on the
heels. Therefore, Madani had no qualms with non-Muslims representing Muslims in
parliament or in any other governing body. For Madani, the separation of electorates or
states was neither desirable nor practicable. Muslims had always been a constituent part
of India’s social fabric. In recent decades, the “social intercourse” with Hindus had even
witnessed a drastic increase.118 Madani pointed out, that today Hindus and Muslims
shared everything: from the “railway stations” to the “assembly”.119 The current
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political rift between Hindus and Muslims, suspected Madani, was an outcome of
imperial divide and rule tactics. To “increase their rule over India”, Madani concluded,
the British had produced fissures and discontent among the indigenous population.120
Iqbal also held the British responsible for the fiery communal climate in India. The
British had “sowed” hatred between Hindus and Muslims, Iqbal writes, so that the
“leech of imperialism might go on to sucking their blood without interruption”.121 Iqbal
and Madani diverged however on the issue of representation. For Iqbal, non-Muslims
could not represent Muslims. They lacked the latent powers that would enable them to
legitimize laws through the process of ijtihad. To Iqbal, Madani’s case for a common
political future seemed naive at best. Even more so, when Madani adorned his inclusive
composite nationalism (muttahida qaumiyyat),122 a somewhat fuzzy concept that mixed
together notions of an Indian caliphate carried by secular institutional structures, with
the Quranic term qaum (nation).123 Iqbal doubted that the concept of qaum was
applicable to non-Muslims in the Indian context.124
In his response to Madani, published in Ehsan on 9 March 1938, Iqbal argued that
since Muslims were a “definite party founded on the Unity of God and the Finality of
Prophethood”, they could not “leave aside their religious unity” and simply “adopt
some social order based upon a different system and law”.125 Iqbal also chastized
Madani’s nationalism for violating Islam’s revealed universal principles. Through poli-
ticizing the concept of territory, well beyond its mere denotation as a geographical
marker, Madani had sullied the fundamental principles of tauhid and khatam-e-nubuw-
wat. What brought Congress Muslims and Ahmadis together, in Iqbal’s comparison,
was that they both utilized urgent “present-day needs” to devise “a position in addition
to what the divine law has prescribed and defined”.126 While Ahmadis had invented “a
new prophethood” and rocked against the principle of khatm-e-nabuwwat, Congress
Muslims had invented the doctrine of composite nationalism and thereby eroded the
principle of tauhid.127
Iqbal bemoaned that the majority community could simply assert itself by declaring
their default cultural position as the starting point for a neutral secular legal order. In
such a secular legal order, Iqbal prophesized, Islam would be quickly squashed into
a “private affair” and eventually altogether dry down to an sanguine cultural relict.128
According to Iqbal, the participation of Indian Muslims in the Congress also required
them to depart from the “prophetic mission” of Islam, and replace it with a formula
handed down to them by the Congress high command. And since the leadership ranks
of the Congress were largely filled with non-Muslims, its Muslim members had
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sacrificed their inert potential for ijtehad.129 This is key for Iqbal’s comparison of
Ahmadis with nationalist Muslims: their political missions relied not on a broad
consensus of an a priori conceived political community, but rather on trust in political
leaders. While Ahmadis denied the “perfection” of Muhammad’s prophethood, Iqbal
asserted, Congress Muslims provided the corresponding political form.130
Iqbal’s short treatise Qadianism and Orthodox Muslims, written in 1935, petitioned the
British government to legally exclude Ahmadis from being counted as Muslims. Iqbal
justified this demand by stating that in the past, rulers had to rely on violence to protect
the integrity of the communities they governed. Today, however, civilizational progress has
replaced the barbaric use of brute force with legal provisions. The crucifixion of Jesus was
a case in point. While the killing of Jesus was to be lamented as an immoral act, Iqbal argued,
it was politically necessary to uphold the solidarity amongst Jewish synods.131 Iqbal’s direct
appeal for government intervention, into an otherwise loosely regulated religious sphere,
came as a surprise to many of his interlocutors. Was Iqbal willing to jeopardize the few
liberties Muslims enjoyed in exchange for this elusive concept of solidarity?
On 1 October 1935, the head of the Lahore wing of the Ahmadiyya, MaulanaMuhammad
Ali, published a lengthy reply to Iqbal’s charges. He asked Iqbal to further clarify howMuslim
solidarity could come about through the iron fist of government intervention. If Iqbal’s
suggestions were implemented, Muhammad Ali foretold, they would fragment the Muslim
community further as opposed to magically producingMuslim solidarity as Iqbal envisioned
it.132 But what enraged Muhammad Ali even more was Iqbal’s suggestion that by crucifying
Jesus the Romans had secured political solidarity amongst the Jews. This take on the
crucifixion was just “humiliating”, Muhammad Ali rumbled. How could maintaining poli-
tical solidarity override the need for prophetic enlightenment and guidance?133
Iqbal countered with an open letter published in the New Statesman. He was not
justifying the crucifixion of Jesus. As Jesus “happened to be a genuine prophet”, the
crucifixion remained morally problematic.134 Politically speaking, however, Iqbal main-
tained, that it was the only viable solution to preserve the solidarity amongst the Jewish
community. Since Romans lacked the legal toolkit to resolve the Jesus-issue without
resorting to violence, their behaviour was, for Iqbal, absolutely justified politically.135
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In the summer of 1935, Iqbal sparred with Jawaharlal Nehru over the meaning of Muslim
solidarity. Writing from a prison cell in Almora, where a number of Congress leaders had
been locked up on trumped up sedition charges, Nehru attacked Iqbal’s petition for
a constitutional ban of Ahmadis to count as Muslim. Nehru’s arguments oscillated between
theological and secular points. First, Nehru pressed Iqbal to explain why Ahmadis had been
the sole target of orthodox scorn. If Iqbal were consistent, Nehru prodded, surely quite a large
number of modernist movements and religious outlets were equally deserving of Iqbal’s
scorn. Nehru wondered why Iqbal had been uncharacteristically soft on the Young Turks and
the Aga Khan.136 Had not such movements deviated much further from Iqbal’s “orthodox
Islam”?137 Some Muslim countries, like Turkey, Iran and Egypt, had even adopted forms of
race-based nationalism that Iqbal detested so much. More still, in their quest to achieve
national unity these countries had unhesitatingly shoved aside Islamic principles that ortho-
dox Muslims held dear.
How could a traditionalist thinker like Iqbal, Nehru persisted, happily embrace all these
modernist trends? Why was Iqbal not reprimanding a large part of the Muslim ummah for
having “ceased to be Islamic countries in any sense of the word”?138 For Nehru, Iqbal’s plea
for excluding Ahmadis reeked of opportunism. The exclusion of Ahmadi’s from being
counted as Muslims, Nehru suspected, stirred just the right amount of antagonism to boost
a fragile consensus amongst Indian Muslims that was just about strong enough to challenge
the doctrine of inclusive nationalism that the Congress Party promoted.139 Iqbal’s Ahmadi
bashing was, to Nehru, just a continuation of the old elitist script known as “Anglo-Moslem
unity”, where a bunch ofMuslim princes struck favourable deals with the British government
that consolidated their power and allowed them to exploit poor Muslim workers. Iqbal’s
Muslim solidarity had little to say about economic equality, and his theological reasons for
excluding Ahmadis were of little help to redeem the weaker sections of Muslim societies of
their economic plights.140
Iqbal addressed Nehru’s critique in a lengthy article published in the January 1936 issue
of the journal Islam. In this article, with the title Islam and Ahmadism, Iqbal lashed out
against both Indian nationalists and Ahmadis. He claimed that Ahmadis would have long
disappeared if it was not for the protection and safeguards of the colonial state. While there
was the obvious difference that Indian nationalists wanted to tear down colonial rule
whereas Ahmadis could not exist without it, Iqbal gybed that there was something that
these two movements had in common: Ahmadis and Indian nationalists both claimed to
speak for majorities that they did not represent in any true sense.141
In response to Nehru’s point that Turkey underMustafa Kemal had strayed fromQuranic
principles, like in her outlawing of polygamy, Iqbal drew a simple distinction between aspects
that were constitutive of the Islam faith––again, he could think of only “two propositions”:
tauhid and khatam-e-nubuwwat––and what Iqbal labelled “minor points” or guidelines,
which ought to be followed but could be, through the practice of performing ijtehad and
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reaching a consensus (ijma), creatively moulded.142 Iqbal defended the Young Turks and the
Aga Khan. He argued that their projects of modernization were compatible with Islamic
orthodoxy. For one, the Turkish nationalist movement was fully justified to abolish the
Caliphate, which after all had only been an archaic reminder of an imperial Islamic system.
For Iqbal, themodern “spirit of democracy” hadmade the caliph’s throne redundant.143 Iqbal
quibbled that the Young Turks wholesale adoption of the Swiss Civil Code for all legalmatters
concerning civic life and their bickering to switch prayer languages, may well constitute
“error[s] of judgement”.144 But they did not in any way undermine the fundamental
principles of Islamic solidarity. Rather, “the forces of Islam”, Iqbal found, had undergirded
Mustafa Kemal’s radical break with the mullahs, and allowed him to liberate the Turkish
people from the clergy’s “dogmatic slumber”.145
For Iqbal, modern Islam had outgrown its imperial mind-set. In a global conglomerate of
Muslim states, Islam would primarily serve as an ethical corrective. In Iqbal’s telling, even if
Muslims were to form a global political union, for instance through the establishment of
a “World League of Muslim States”, their distinct national heritages would remain.146
Nationality would always be a political requirement in order to participate in a global political
system.147 For countries that were made up of Muslimmajorities, in Iqbal’s view, the reliance
on nationalist ideas was not harmful to Muslim society. Since all legislative decisions were
based on consensus, the process of ijtihad legitimized the legislature as long as the two
universal limitations were kept.
For Muslim minority countries, however, particularly in places where the majority
religion was non-Abrahamic, Iqbal insisted that it was crucial to keep the spirit of Islam
alive. This was only possible by establishing a distinct Muslim national life. Once this
national life blossomed into a measurable cultural force, Muslims could make use of their
political right to self-determination.148 Anything that threatened the underlying Muslim
solidarity had to be combatted. Iqbal accused Nehru of fundamentally misreading the
Ahmadiyya question as one of individual morality, something to be measured along the
binaries of “good or bad”.149 But for Iqbal, the Ahmadiyya question was much more than
that. For Iqbal, the question could only be measured in the binaries of “life-giving or life-
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Conclusion
On 21 June 1937, in a letter to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Iqbal lamented that the constitu-
tional effort “for a single Indian federation is completely hopeless”.151 Iqbal’s bleak assess-
ment was based on “at least four cases of vilification of the Prophet by Hindus and
Sikhs”.152 Iqbal reminded Jinnah that “[t]here have also been cases of burning the Quran
in Sind”.153 This alone warranted the angst that another “Palestine may be repeated” in
India.154 Iqbal also felt the need to reassure Jinnah that “in each of the four cases, the villifier
has been murdered”.155 While the military presence had temporarily cooled communal
sentiments, Iqbal thought that without the establishment of Muslim states in the majority
provinces of Bengal and Punjab, “the only other alternative is a civil war”.156
After further evaluating the issue of communal agitations, Iqbal determined that commu-
nal conflicts were “purely political” and reflected “the desire of the Sikhs and Hindus to
intimidateMuslims even in theMuslimmajority provinces”.157 The sole reason for thisHindu
and Sikh bullyingwas “the new constitution” (Government of IndiaAct of 1935) underwhich,
Iqbal mourned, “the Muslims are made entirely dependent on non-Muslims”.158 For Iqbal,
the arrangements of the new Constitution, although conceding to some burning political
demands of India’s Muslims––for instance, separate electorates and weightage––was funda-
mentally dishonest. It overwhelmingly benefitted “the sons of upper classes… and the friends
or relatives of the ministers”.159 In Iqbal’s view, the concessions given to Indian Muslims
merely amounted to little more than a symbolic recognition of Muslims as political subjects.
The Constitution did not view Muslims as a distinct political force.
During the first Indian provincial election, in the winter of 1936–1937, Nehru led the
Congress to a landslide victory. Though the Muslim League had emerged as a sizable force,
Jinnah’s dream of uniting Muslims under a single political banner had flopped. The League
even lost roughly half of the constituencies reserved for Muslims candidates.160 The
electoral segregation on the basis of religion and the concession that the Constitution
made towards a strong federalist structure, sat awkwardly with the rhetoric of both the
League and the Congress. For the Congress leadership, the Constitution made it difficult to
forgo the minority question in their election manifesto, though they somehow still largely
rushed over it. For the League the situation was worse. The emergence of provincial Muslim
organizations that ran from same reserved seats, like the Unionist party and the Krishak-
Proja party in the Punjab and Bengal respectively, undermined the very legitimacy of the
League to speak for all Indian Muslims. For Iqbal, there was a way out of the League’s
dilemma, a way that would “secure a peaceful India and save Muslims domination of non-
Muslims”.161 As Iqbal suggested pointedly: “Why should not the Muslims of North-West
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India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other
nations in India and outside India are?”162
In this article, I have offered an initial sketch of Iqbal’s constitutionalism. The first part
outlined how Iqbal pieced together a new republican subjectivity anchored in khudi. This
individuality, I have argued, was made operational as a collective political force through
a detour to the figure of the Prophet Muhammad. For Iqbal, sacrifices for the Prophet ought
to be the primary marker to determine Muslim citizenship. Regarding legal and constitu-
tional change, Iqbal largely applauded the transformations modernity ushered in. For Iqbal,
a Muslim Legislature should only be bound by a minimal set of rules, leaving much of what
was to be decided in the hands of the people. Through ijtihad and ijma, Iqbal proposed,
IndianMuslims could one day govern (almost) unburdened from theological constraints. Yet
Iqbal showed surprisingly little hospitality for the participation of non-Muslims in this future
republican framework.
The article has further found that Iqbal’s antagonistic gestures towards the Ahmadis
resonate with key aspects of his political thought, ranging fromquestions of political authority
and solidarity to constitutional republicanism. Iqbal was aware that antagonisms within
societies and religious communities, terms that for Iqbal largely overlapped in India, could
not easily be absorbed through liberal political practices of reasoned debate and representa-
tion. But if such antagonismwent unchecked, however, it would dissolveMuslim solidarity. In
order to keep religious communities alive, the legal order had to therefore acknowledge
theological differences and accept any internal religious consensus brought before it, however
illiberal the demandmay appear. Iqbal further held that the legal order had to reflect thewill of
the popular sovereign: the law had to mirror itself in society and adopt current values and
principles, as long as they accommodated the constitutional limitations of tauhid and the
finality of prophethood.
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